Currently, CMI`s definition could include scientific information and technologies generated by Japanese or U.S. government agencies, provided that such information is clearly “defense-related.” 26 In a broader sense, the U.S. government has developed a set of policies and procedures for the exchange of CMI and other sensitive information with other countries.27 Applied technical data, applied research and development, controlled unclassified information, and other components of so-called international programs related to defense or national security are subject to the National Disclosure Policy (NPD).28 Such a policy Disclosure is not based on Defence-related material is limited and may be limited to a broader range of research related to national security. However, there are five basic disclosure criteria, all of which must be met before sensitive or classified information can be shared with non-U.S. citizens. Institutions or personnel: Determined to strengthen the overall relationship between science and technology on the basis of the principles of shared responsibility and mutual and equitable contributions and benefits corresponding to the respective scientific and technological strengths and resources of the two countries; The Japanese government could also expand the justification for “scientific, technological or economic issues related to national security” as an amendment to FEFTA. This could strengthen the government`s ability to control the export of technological research and the hiring of foreigners (considered exports) in certain situations. Combined with the above recommendation in the context of the SDS Act, these measures would raise the bar for industrial security in Japan and make it easier for the United States and Japan to develop general licensing agreements that could facilitate the exchange of controlled goods and a wider range of sensitive information in a timely manner. As one former U.S. government official put it, “If we want a true technology alliance, then we need a way to access each other more freely.” 171 50 Dan Brouillette, “Department of Energy International Science and Technology Engagement Policy” (Official Memorandum, Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2018), accessed May 10, 2021 www.sciencemag.org/sites/default/files/DECEMBER%20DOE%20MEMO.pdf. 45 Under CRADA (and when negotiated under other structures), the US Government retains the `right of invasion` in accordance with the Bayh Dole Act. These intellectual property rights are reserved to the government to ensure that intellectual property generated with federal funds can be commercialized.
If the government determines that the ACARO partner has renounced its efforts to commercialize or sufficiently disseminate the intellectual property resulting from the investigation (if it still holds the license of that technology), it may force the partner to license the intellectual property to a third party interested in commercializing the technology at a negotiated “reasonable” royalty. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 illustrate another important change underway. Figure 4-5 compares Japan`s total government investment in science and technology for the 1991-1995 fiscal years with that of the United States, which is converted at both purchasing power parity (PPP) and current exchange rates (CERs). Figure 4-6 compares projected public investment for fiscal years 1996-2000. While the Japanese government has set a goal of spending 17 trillion yen during this period, the U.S. government`s R&D spending is expected to be limited due to ongoing efforts to close the federal budget deficit. Assuming that about 6 percent of Japan`s total will be defense-related, as is the case today, japanese government investments in non-defense science and technology during the period 1996-2000 are expected to reach nearly 90 percent of the U.S. total at current exchange rates.
3 Furthermore, since the SDF Act covers only scientific or technical information directly related to military equipment (and not to Japan`s general national security), the Government does not have the authority to issue a security clearance to a civilian researcher or private sector employee outside of this context. MeXT, for example, does not have the authority to issue an authorization to anyone under its jurisdiction. This has a significant impact on Japan`s possible technical cooperation with the United States in non-military fields, such as the United States. Policymakers consider them sensitive enough to be kept secret, including some classified R&D involving certain fields of quantum computing, materials science, AI, space systems and other advanced technologies. Similarly, the Japanese government is unlikely to be able to release private sector individuals to allow domestic companies to use secret cybersecurity information shared by friendly governments to protect themselves from zero-day attacks.114 4 U.S. officials saw the advisory board as a way to raise their “worrisome issues.” in scientific and technical relations with Japan. . . . to the attention of senior [American] officials. See National Research Council, Strategies for Achieving U.S. Objectives in Science and Technology Relations with Japan: Report of a Workshop (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1996), p.
14, doi.org/10.17226/9230. Japan`s FEFTA provides the government with various traditional tools to manage private companies` interactions with other countries.133 The most applicable technological security tools include export controls and investment restrictions, but there are some gaps in law enforcement that significantly limit coverage when considering compatibility with the United States. While a fundamental purpose of the law is to support “the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and the international community,” it is limited to the “necessary minimum of control or coordination of foreign transactions.” 134 Given the close scientific cooperation between the two countries, it might be useful to examine in more detail the agreements between the United States and Israel. Despite Israel`s inclusion in the ministry`s list of sensitive countries, the relationship sometimes involves classified information.53 The same is true to some extent for India, which is also on the list of sensitive countries, but recently concluded an ISA with the United States that allows for a wider range of defense-related cooperation. The main difference in these cases – in terms of why Washington allows for a more permissive exchange of information – is that both countries are known to have a well-developed and robust system for protecting classified information, including an effective process for reviewing and training individuals or organizations that have been granted authorizations.54 In fiscal year 2020, the DOD has identified several priority areas for its Investment. including quantum science, defensive and offensive hypersonics, directed energy, AI and biotechnology. In addition, the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) allocated more than $105 billion to research, prototyping and related evaluation programs for fiscal year 2021. Of this amount, more than $8 billion has been allocated to basic and applied research, much of which is conducted through academic institutions and research laboratories of the armed forces. .